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INTRODUCTION
This discussion paper is the product of a workshop entitled
“Supporting Good Governance of Extractive Industries in Politically
Hostile Settings: A View from Sub-Saharan Africa,” organized by the
Oxford Martin School (OMS) Programme on African Governance
and the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) and
supporting research. The workshop brought together global
and local researchers and practitioners with a wide range of
experience with extractives governance, particularly, though not
exclusively, in the sub-Saharan African region. The meeting built
on prior research and discussions held as part of CCSI’s project on
the Politics of Extractive Industries, dedicated to supporting the
field of actors working to improve the governance of extractive
industries (henceforth, the “GEI field”) in their efforts to think and
work in more politically savvy ways. By sharing some initial insights
from this work, we hope to contribute to broader conversations
on how to improve practical approaches to supporting good
governance and development in a range of political settings,
including some of the most repressive and challenging.

I. RATIONALE: WHY WE NEED TO ADDRESS POLITICALLY
HOSTILE SETTINGS
Extractive industries pose extensive and well-known
governance and development challenges. Natural resource
wealth, and the extractive activity that accompanies it, has
long been associated with high levels of poverty, economic
exploitation, and authoritarian governance.1 Oil wealth, in
particular, correlates strongly, with few exceptions, with less
democracy, heightened corruption, and a decline in the quality
of state institutions, thus making it more likely that governments
of states dependent on extractive industries (EI) will become
or remain authoritarian.2 EI dependence also seems to be
frequently accompanied by persistent poverty in the broader
population and an array of negative social and environmental
impacts.3 In addition, good practices on various aspects of GEI
across the value chain can be highly technical and require a
series of sound decisions and actions across the lifetime of EI
projects, some or all of which elude many governments.4
Existing approaches to improving the GEI have tended to
focus on two clusters of activity. Attempting to steer EI toward
better governance and development outcomes, over the last few
decades, the work of the GEI field has tended to cluster around
two broad types of activities.
One emphasizes the promotion of EI transparency as a means to
empower citizens and government actors to police government
activity and to demand accountability, via informal or formal
participation pathways, when governments and officials do

not govern the sector in a developmental manner, e.g., through
misuse or misappropriation of revenues intended to benefit the
population as a whole or failure to properly regulate social and
environmental impacts.5 These so-called “TPA approaches” and
activities have been prominent in the GEI field since its inception
roughly 20 years ago—around calls for EI companies to “Publish
What You Pay”6 —built on the contributions of the Publish What
You Pay (PWYP) coalition, Global Witness, Natural Resource
Governance Institute (NRGI) (formerly Revenue Watch Institute),
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and,
more recently, the work of the Open Contracting Partnership
(OCP) and many others along the way. While originally focused
on company payments and government revenues, calls for EI
transparency now stretch across the full length of the EI value
chain and beyond (with recent prominent efforts focused on
beneficial ownership transparency).
The second major area of GEI research and practice posits that
technically sound policies, laws, and institutions are the key to
good sector governance. These more “technical approaches”
to GEI, are often the centerpieces of interventions by global
development actors focused on host governments and tend to
entail: 1) identifying and developing guidance and standards
around good practice for governments on a range of issues
across the EI value chain, from oversight and administration
of exploration and licensing processes to public financial
management of EI revenues to regulation of the social and
environmental impacts of EI projects;7 and 2) promoting uptake
and implementation of this guidance through capacity-building
and technical assistance usually to government agencies and
officials formally charged with these roles for a given issue area.8
While efforts to advance good GEI through these two clusters of
approaches have generated important progress on GEI in some
instances, in others the track record has been decidedly less
constructive.
“What you’re talking about doesn’t work when it comes to
[oil/gas/mining] in my country.” Meeting organizers heard
this frustration on many occasions from country-level experts,
typically from more repressive or closed contexts, in response
to discussions or interventions initiated by the global GEI field.
These actors with deep local knowledge pointed out that
in many countries, much of the field’s technical assistance
is squandered and initiatives focusing on transparency and
accountability result in little more than window dressing. Even
worse, these efforts might have the unintended consequences
of bringing additional resources and reputational benefits to
leaders who have little interest in fostering good governance
and sustainable development of EI for their people and might
even be responsible for governance challenges facing those
countries in the first place.9 Similarly, global development actors
have lamented that, despite decades of technical assistance and
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growing commitments to transparency, there are places that
seem impervious to meaningful progress on prescribed reforms,
leaving their populations to languish. Thus, we decided to take
an initial pass at thinking through potentially significant political
contextual factors that may make certain settings more “hostile
ground” to progress through traditional GEI approaches. For the
purposes of this initial exploration, the organizers referred to
these as “politically hostile settings” (PHS).

• revelation of problematic sector governance →
• sense of grievance/desire for change →
• actors within or beyond government demanding reform or

The pandemic has increased the urgency for tackling
these issues. The COVID-19 pandemic has made finding more
effective approaches to advancing good governance of EI under
challenging political conditions more urgent than ever. The
crisis increased levels of need among the poorest and most
vulnerable segments of many countries’ populations. Moreover,
repressive governments around the world have also capitalized
on legitimate needs for public health measures to slow the
spread of the virus to consolidate their own power, further close
off civic spaces, and crack down on dissent.10

While this seems to be roughly how things are hoped to play
out by GEI practitioners supporting TPA activities, none of these
steps is inevitable, each is conditioned by context and any can
be derailed along the way.12 In order to work as intended, TPA
approaches rest on certain assumptions about the governance
context in which they unfold, including: the state is democratic or
semi-democratic, with open, healthy civic space that allows for
key actors to meaningfully act to demand reform or response from
those in power (and that citizens have the capacity to synthesize
and use information from transparency efforts); power is relatively
diffuse and subject to checks; and powerful actors in government
are responsive to their populations and prioritize serving the
broader public good.

This discussion paper describes and summarizes the
foundational thinking and insights that emerged from the
workshop, from discussions of the Executive Session on the
Politics of Extractive Industries, and from supplementary
literature review and interviews to inform these discussions. It
captures expert views on key reasons for the limited progress
of GEI initiatives in achieving meaningful improvements in
PHS. It also synthesizes ideas for how to more effectively design
approaches to introducing and advancing good GEI in these
settings.

II. BACKGROUND: EXISTING APPROACHES TO GEI AND
THEIR KEY UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
As a starting point for unpacking and understanding how and
why specific approaches to improving GEI might not work in
certain settings, we considered how practitioners in the GEI field
imagine they should work and what underlying assumptions
would need to be made for these approaches to function
as intended and deliver progress toward intended impacts.
It is worth noting that for many years, the GEI field worked to
advance EI transparency without a clear underlying logic for
how this would precipitate good sector governance but in recent
years there have been more attempts to link transparency with
accountability and participatory governance. At the most basic
level, the theory of change behind these TPA efforts in the GEI
field has implicitly involved:

• EI transparency commitments being undertaken and
implemented →

• production and dissemination of relevant, timely, credible,
accurate, and accessible data/information →

redress (through some sort of participation pathway) →

• positive responses from those with power over the outcomes
in question →

• greater accountability and/or practical changes in governance
in response to these demands11

Similarly, with the more technically-focused interventions
across the EI value chain, the hope is that standard-setting,
guidance on good practice and technical assistance will fill
knowledge and capacity gaps that impede the realization of
good sector governance. For these to yield intended results,
we would have to assume that: government officials typically
on the receiving end of such interventions are both able to shape
outcomes over which they have formal authority (they can put
guidance into practice without being subject to the pressure
or interference of other actors); and leaders are committed to
maximizing benefits to the broader population (they prioritize the
social welfare goals these interventions are intended to advance).
Thus, taken together, existing approaches to supporting
improvements in GEI are most likely to deliver progress when
the following political contextual conditions hold:
1. open/democratic governance - the state is democratic or
semi-democratic, with open, healthy civic space, responsive
governments, and power is diffused and subject to checks rather
than concentrated;
2. citizen welfare prioritized - those with the most power to
shape GEI outcomes prioritize broader social and economic
welfare over narrower personal, predatory, political or special
interest goals; and
3. functional and independent authorities - the state, supported
by technocrats within government, is functional and those on
the receiving end of technocratic interventions possess genuine
power to shape GEI policies, laws, and institutions and can do so
without being subject to political interference.
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These assumptions—likely derived from idealized characteristics
of developed countries from which notions of “good governance”
are generated13 —may fail to reflect prevailing conditions in
resource-rich countries across a wide range of development
rankings.

III. THE PROBLEM: MISMATCHES BETWEEN
ASSUMPTIONS AND POLITICAL REALITIES UNDERMINE
IMPACT
As we sought to unpack the nature and potential causes
of the under-performance of existing approaches in some
settings, it became clear that an important part of the problem
being observed was a misalignment between the underlying
assumptions of most existing approaches of the global GEI
field and the realities of some political contexts in which these
approaches were being applied. The greater the disparity
between implicitly assumed conditions and real conditions, the
more “politically hostile” such settings would prove for existing
approaches and the less likely that they (and the human, political,
and financial capital behind them) would yield their intended
benefits. They might even end up unintentionally doing harm, as
noted above. In these “politically hostile settings” (PHS) where
conventional approaches to improving GEI have had limited
success, new thinking is needed on how to make better use
of resources deployed to improve governance in these cases.
Therefore, the workshop was convened to bring together experts
with a wide range of experience with extractives governance
particularly, though not exclusively, in the sub-Saharan African
region to 1) specify some of the conditions that can make PHS
particularly challenging for mainstream approaches to GEI; and
2) propose and discuss initial ideas and strategies that might be
more appropriate for trying to improve real governance outcomes
in those settings.

Contextual realities of “politically hostile settings”
During a prior workshop discussion,14 participants were asked
to brainstorm on some of the characteristics of those political
settings where existing approaches to supporting good GEI
were delivering the least progress in practice. Describing
them broadly as “authoritarian,” “clientelistic,” “predatory,”
or “kleptocratic,” participants associated some or all of the
following characteristics with these settings:

• actively repressive government, backed by a strong coercive
•
•
•

apparatus;
elites who prioritize their own narrow interests, or those of
favored groups, over opportunities for broader development;
extremely limited civic space and active suppression of
opposing voices;
governments issuing or allowing significant threats to the
physical security of those who push for reform;

• non-independent (captured) judiciaries;
• informal institutions—customs, norms,

•
•
•
•

traditions,
relationships, power structures, etc. operating outside formal
state channels of authority—playing an important role in
determining policy or implementation;15
little or no free press;
weak or poorly articulated civil society;
endemic (or normalized) corruption; and
blurring of public and private sector power resulting from
cronyism, nepotism, and direct economic interests/roles of
political elites.

Clustering items on this list, PHS could be understood as
departing from the key assumptions described in the previous
section as follows:
1. closed and repressive governments - PHS are more
authoritarian than democratic contexts—civic space is highly
constrained, civil society capacity actively limited, and dominant
elites rule with concentrated power and discretion, at times
through repressive and violent tactics;16
2. the powerful lack the will or incentives to pursue social
welfare goals - for elites exerting the most de facto power over
outcomes, advancing broad social well-being is a low priority
relative to serving their own interests or those of key political and
economic allies; and
3. formal institutions and authorities are weak or subject to
interference - informal institutions and the exercise of influence
by powerful actors within and beyond government may be more
important in rule-making and determining outcomes than formal
institutions and authority.
Examples of PHS in which all three political contextual conditions
departed significantly from underlying assumptions of existing
work discussed in the African context included Angola, Chad,
Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
and Zimbabwe, among others. However, if one looks beyond
Africa and also for cases where just one or more of the ideal
assumptions do not hold, then hostile ground for existing
approaches becomes far more common among resource-rich
countries worldwide.

How authoritarian practices can impede impact: a
power problem
In political contexts characterized by more authoritarian
attributes and practices, the distribution of power is highly
asymmetrical. They are settings in which power is centralized and
concentrated in the hands of a few key actors who operate with
significant discretion. Citizen empowerment and participation
in governance is minimized or even actively discouraged. These
realities can have major ramifications for both TPA and more
technocratic approaches to improving GEI.
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Centralized power. The centralization of power often
means that those benefiting from “bad GEI” can deploy their
disproportionate influence and access to EI (especially oil) rents
and other resources at their disposal—including the coercive
apparatus and other institutions of the state—to maintain the
status quo. They can do this by avoiding or undermining the
implementation of nominal reforms and shutting down—at
times through violence, threat, and repression—formal and
informal channels for citizen demands, voice, and participation,
which are critical to the success of TPA interventions. These
privileged positions can also be used to impede attempts by
others in government to exercise accountability functions,
to punish or co-opt opponents, and to firm up key political
and economic allies while largely avoiding the need to be
responsive to the demands of broader populations.17 Even
when not actively deployed, the concentration of power in the
hands of a few elites or a single ruling party can have a de facto
demobilizing effect on those who might demand accountable
governance: when they feel little hope or faith in the prospects
for change, their motivation to act to demand accountability or
reform can be stymied.
Centralization of power and discretionary decision-making can
also undercut the traction that technocratic interventions across
the value chain can achieve, frequently resulting in reforms not
being undertaken at all or appearing to happen on paper but
not in practice.18 Laws and Marquette argue, “the persistence
of poor policy and dysfunctional institutions usually has less
to do with a lack of knowledge or finance than with the actions
of powerful actors, groups or collective movements who gain
from existing arrangements and resist change.”19 In contexts
where power is concentrated in the hands of a few, approaches
that prod governments to adopt certain rules for GEI that these
actors perceive to be at odds with their interests are unlikely to
see them implemented as intended even with adequate levels
of technical capacity. Even when commitments to reform are
made, bureaucrats who would oversee their implementation
—e.g., around anti-corruption efforts or environmental impact
assessment or FPIC processes—have shared with us how they
can be pressured or coerced by powerful figures into desisting
from attempts to push for meaningful implementation.20
Restrictions on civic space. In terms of restricting citizen
participation and pathways for pursuing accountability building
on EI transparency, resource-rich developing countries have
severe restrictions on civic space and on opportunities for
communities to participate in influencing GEI.21 Simply put,
some powerful leaders actively impede the empowerment of
their broader populations. These restrictions themselves may be
formal—i.e., legal, regulatory, or administrative—or informal.22
Formal restrictions include the criminalization and prosecution
of certain kinds of speech or gatherings, the constriction of media
freedoms, and administrative measures to limit NGO registration

and operations.23 While the shrinking of civic space has been
noted on a global scale for several years, the crisis precipitated
by COVID-19 has fostered new efforts to expand and accelerate
this shrinkage through heightened media censorship24 and
restrictions on movement and assembly.25
Informal restrictions may range from narrative framing efforts to
de-legitimize or stigmatize civil society actors and organizations
to harassment, intimidation, torture, and killing of activists and
others aiming to expose and address EI governance challenges.26
In some areas, formal and informal restrictions may overlap.
According to the CIVICUS Monitor, “states abuse their monopoly
over the power of arrest with appalling frequency, routinely
detaining journalists, activists and protesters, usually for no
lawful reason,” using illegal detention as cover for state agents
to intimidate, harass, and in the worst cases, torture suspected
dissenters.27 Abuse of judicial systems can also be used to
harass opposition politicians and activists by embroiling them in
specious and costly court battles. Many workshop participants
viewed the climate of fear created by formal and informal
restrictions on civic action as one of the most challenging
aspects of working on governance in PHS, especially when
GEI initiatives can increase serious risks facing civil society,
citizen activists, and participating communities or may lead to
a general disengagement from GEI issues if not complemented
with protective measures such as legal and physical defense to
combat threats and repression.28
In addition to restrictions and intimidation, authoritarian
regimes and leaders, or those working on their behalf, may
actively co-opt civil society actors, as Lorch and Bunk argue
has occurred in Mozambique and Algeria.29 Co-optation of civil
society has also been raised as a concern in the context of some
EITI multi-stakeholder groups (MSGs). In theory, MSGs create
a formal participatory opening for civil society, but in practice,
they too can at times be susceptible to influence or capture
by governments seeking to shut down an avenue for potential
opposition.30
Under such circumstances, EI transparency may well yield
limited or compromised data and significant barriers to
action based on it. As a result of contextual conditions being
so challenging, the odds are stacked against existing TPA
interventions leading to meaningful progress. They may even
backfire when governments in such settings are able to reap
reputational benefits from joining initiatives like EITI or touting
their use of consultation processes even as they actively impede
the potential impacts of these activities, one version of the
“open-washing” phenomenon. 31
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When reforms designed to improve social well-being
meet private or particularistic interests: an interests and
incentives problem
Current approaches to improving GEI that emphasize identifying
best practices for various aspects of sector governance across
the value chain and propagating technical capacity support to
implement these implicitly assume that the state is developmentoriented and that leaders prioritize broad social welfare over
other interests.32 In other words, those with the power to shape
GEI want first and foremost to maximize the benefits of the
sector to the wider population. Within this framing, inadequate
knowledge and capacity may reasonably appear to be the main
impediments to better GEI. While this assumption may apply in
some cases, in many others, poor governance is less a function
of incompetence than of predatory or particularistic preferences
among powerful government and business elites. Some wellknown manifestations of this in resource-rich countries include:
• corruption and kleptocracy - when leaders’ main interests
are maximizing personal gains through abuse of their
political power as well as the siphoning, appropriation or
embezzlement of resources for personal benefit;33
• clientelism - when leaders’ primary interests are using the
benefits of EI activities to secure or sustain political patronage
and support;34 and
• state capture - when leaders bend the legislative, policymaking, judicial and regulatory functions of the state in
service of powerful private interests, including extractives
companies.35
The advice and technical assistance on offer to actors with
such interests are unlikely to be used to prioritize real pursuit
of broader social gains, even when occasionally appearing to
commit to such. A common tactic among self-serving, corrupt
or captured officials presented with unwanted outside pressures
for governance reform is sham cooperation. This involves
appearing to comply with reform agendas—for example, by
joining international agreements, making legislative changes,
or setting up new institutions in line with transplanted “best
practices”—while simultaneously ensuring those measures do
not meaningfully influence existing arrangements.36
Similarly, where leaders’ primary interests are in serving
themselves, political allies, and/or private sector firms, TPA
approaches will also have a harder time gaining traction. When
officials are driven by such priorities and not by social welfare,
TPA interventions assuming government responsiveness to
accountability demands are unlikely to unfold as intended.
Moreover, as noted above, their power can be deployed to
undercut attempts to foster transparency and participation
needed to enable such demands in the first place. At a “nuts and

bolts” level, corrupt officials can try to undercut the accuracy
and credibility of EI data in order to shield mismanagement
and corruption from view and sow distrust in reform processes
if the inaccuracies are exposed.37 They can also shut down
participation pathways as noted above in the discussion
on civic space. Recall that in Azerbaijan, the launch of EITI
data disclosures coincided with a broad crackdown on civil
society, leading to what Oge terms “mock compliance.”38 This
reveals that leaders’ priorities in joining the initiative were not
grounded in social welfare but likely in anticipated international
reputational benefits, a phenomenon in no way exclusive to EITI.

The problem(s) with state-centric technocratic reforms
where de facto governance and formal authority are
misaligned: a location problem
Targeting the wrong actors. A number of experts noted that
another significant challenge to impact was the fact that the
technocratic, state-centric interventions of many development
organizations target actors and institutions that do not
represent who really determines governance outcomes on the
ground nor how they do it. Thus, state-centric interventions
can fall flat when the state officials nominally tasked with
a particular aspect of GEI lack autonomy or influence over
relevant outcomes. As noted above, in PHS, power may be
concentrated in the hands of a single leader, or a small group
of political and economic elites, with significant formal and
informal influence and discretion over policy-making and
implementation processes.39 Interventions that emphasize
educating and equipping technocrats to implement formal rules
are unlikely to be productive if the rules in question conflict with
the agendas of powerful political or economic actors.40 Elites
hostile to GEI reform objectives may try to redirect the fruits of
bureaucratic capacity-building to advance their own interests
and those of personal or political allies.41 In settings where
political institutions and norms of accountability are weak or
absent, technocratic interventions focused, for instance, on
building the capacity of state functionaries to gather and analyze
EI sector data may actually increase the ability of corrupt officials
to tighten control over entities in the EI sector for illicit ends.42
Isolated initiatives directed toward identifying, training, and
supporting civic-minded bureaucrats within corrupt agencies
will do little to alter governance if these actors lack independent
leeway to steer outcomes.
Focusing on the wrong actions. In addition, it was suggested
that technocratic interventions focused on reforming formal
policies, laws, and institutions achieve very little when they
fail to account for the extent to which society, institutions, and
governing structures operate on the basis of informal rules,
authority (e.g., traditional authority), and relationships. In many
developing countries, even where formal rules exist, they may
not be the sole or dominant influence over governance outcomes
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and are often unequally enforced against the powerful.43
Access to formal institutions such as courts and bureaucratic
agencies and their services may be limited by informal rules
(such as the need for personal connections), which restrict
regular citizens to a much greater degree than elites.44 Similarly,
when formal laws are less influential in shaping certain outcomes
than, say, the dictates of traditional leaders, technocratic legal
reforms will likely be of limited impact. Therefore, even when
good GEI policies are announced, laws passed, and institutions
formalized, changes in behavior and outcomes will not
necessarily result where informality in governance is pervasive
and determinative of de facto outcomes.
___________________________________________________
Unfortunately, in many settings, prevailing conditions deviate
considerably from one or more of the standard underlying
assumptions of much of the mainstream approaches to GEI—real
power to shape outcomes can be highly asymmetrical, residing
beyond formal authority and institutions, and favor those whose
chief interests are not broader social welfare. While there will be
variation across the different types of challenges from one context
to the next, it is not uncommon for the three to go hand-in-hand.
Thus, where these assumptions deviate substantially from
conditions on the ground, theories of change and business-asusual approaches to GEI interventions built on one or more of
these assumptions require fundamental rethinking.

IV. WORKING DIFFERENTLY IN PHS
Traditionally, GEI practitioners facing the realities of PHS seem
to opt for one of two pathways:
• business as usual - deploying the same top-down, one-sizefits-all approaches as elsewhere, at times hoping for good
results but often simply adjusting down expectations for
impact in the belief that even some modicum of potential
progress (or just staving off worsening outcomes) with these
is “better than nothing”; and
• exit/avoidance - rather than risk seeing favored toolkits fail or
unintentionally generating harm, some INGOs and donors are
inclined to discontinue or avoid working on GEI interventions
in these settings on the grounds that the governance problems
in PHS are too difficult or involve too many risks.
Business as usual. The general feeling among our experts was
that taking a ‘business as usual’ approach to GEI reforms that
fails to account for the contextual realities of PHS risks wasted
resources on activities that generate little impact, potentially
counterproductive interventions, and missed opportunities
for advancing real progress on GEI through more appropriate
strategies and approaches. As discussed above, standard
technocratic solutions and well-intentioned idealism of existing

work on transparency and accountability do not solve political
problems rooted in power asymmetries, competing interests,
and practices falling outside the formal institutionalism of
governance in Western democracies. Ignoring these facts and
channeling financial, technical, and reputational benefits toward
officials who are often the net beneficiaries of governance
deficiencies (or influenced by those who are) is likely to do little
to realign underlying factors driving negative GEI outcomes
in PHS. The opportunity costs associated with misguided GEI
interventions are a further cause for concern. Efforts to transplant
institutional models and practices into settings that lack key
preconditions for their successful operation risk squandering
finite reform energy and resources that could potentially be
used more productively. They can also potentially tarnish the
credibility of GEI reform efforts and the actors promoting them
in the eyes of intended beneficiaries and dissuade country-level
interlocutors from engagement on these issues.
Exit/avoidance. The exit/avoidance option generated mixed
reactions amongst our participants. On the one hand, some
argued that avoiding working in PHS due to the low prospects
of success and potential risks of unintended consequences with
traditional GEI approaches might be preferable to deploying
considerable resources to ultimately accomplish little or
unintentionally do harm.45 In short, doing nothing would be
better than getting interventions wrong. They noted that GEI
practitioners are already absent from some of the most significant
resource producers in the world, such as Russia, China, Saudi
Arabia, and Iran, where their presence is unwelcome. Some
of our experts also highlighted the finite resources available
for GEI work: significant investments in authoritarian settings
where the chances of success are minimal can come at the cost
of directing resources and attention in other, more amenable
settings where real gains are more feasible. However, others
felt that the prospects of donor or INGO flight from PHS would
be problematic because it is often the populations of such
challenging governance settings who benefit least/suffer the
most from EI development, i.e., PHS tend to be where the need for
improved GEI is greatest. Withdrawing, rather than repurposing,
GEI resources and expertise closes channels of communication
with policy-makers and local officials and deprives local civil
society actors of political cover needed to devise and undertake
bottom-up initiatives. They also argued that not only can exiting
PHS remove pressure on uncooperative host governments and
corporate decision-makers to at least go through the motions
of appearing to care about improving EI governance, it also can
make recognizing, and acting upon, new opportunities to shift
local governance trajectories in productive ways more difficult.
With existing approaches acknowledged to be a poor fit for PHS
and avoidance or exit viewed as suboptimal options even for
PHS, the group considered alternatives for supporting improved
GEI in such challenging contexts.
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Designing interventions for PHS: General principles

Most practitioners in the GEI field today are not naïve about
the difficulty of achieving governance reform in PHS. However,
the participants did think there might be ways of working more
effectively and impactfully on GEI in light of the particular
political challenges posed by PHS. For the purposes of this note,
their suggestions are organized according to the framework used
across CCSI’s analyses of the politics of extractive industries,
one that organizes general approaches to addressing political
obstacles into three categories:
I. Navigate - accept political context as is and strategize for
maximum impact within those constraints and opportunities;
II. Change - seek to change key elements of political context to
better align with a given reform agenda or approach to pursuing
this; and
III. Circumvent - develop ways to work around political
blockages to achieve desired results through other actors or
pathways.
Strategies touched on below within these categories are
meant to be illustrative and provide inspiration rather than
being prescriptive. They may be undertaken individually or in
tandem, depending on the priorities and goals of the GEI field
actor in question and the demands and opportunities of a given
situation.
As a starting point for all of these, participants noted that some
of the general process guidance emerging from the Thinking
and Working Politically (TWP) community of practice and others
would be particularly relevant to those designing interventions
around improving GEI in PHS.46 Arguing that every PHS presents
different challenges and opportunities, they underscored the
value of:

• investing in resources to conduct some sort of political

•
•

•
•

economy analysis (PEA) to help map the landscape of key
power, interest, and political systemic factors impacting
relevant governance outcomes in a specific context on an
ongoing basis;
integrating insights from PEA into program, project, and
initiative design processes;
being as locally-led as possible, with local partners playing a
central role in helping to identify GEI needs and priorities as
well as guiding the development of strategies and approaches
to address these needs within that particular setting;
allowing interventions to be problem-driven, responding to
the specific challenges (and openings to address these) in a
given context; and
committing to flexible, iterative, and adaptive approaches that
contrast with the fairly fixed traditional technocratic models
and allow for experimentation, learning, and adjustment as

needed to try to make progress wherever possible and to
respond to changing constraints and opportunities in the
political landscape as well as to lessons learned along the way
about addressing these limitations and openings.
In addition to these points, meeting participants emphasized
that actors in the global GEI field should be mindful of real
and perceived threats and risks facing those advancing the
GEI agenda (whether in government47 or broader society48)
and actively consider how the activities of global actors can
exacerbate or mitigate those threats. The next step would then
be to try to devise GEI approaches and strategies to address the
realities of a given PHS more effectively.
Finally, some participants noted that donors, INGOs, and others
in the GEI field should consider adjusting goals and timelines49
to accommodate what is necessary and plausible under the
circumstances of a particular PHS, which may mean aspirations
for major transformations giving way to more modest or
incremental changes in the near term and/or systemic reforms
giving way to more narrowly-focused “islands” of progress on
a specific aspect of GEI. Short- and medium- term goals might
also be adjusted to focus on creating conducive conditions, e.g.,
opening or defending civic space, for more progressive long-term
goals. Participants also noted that decisions about appropriate
goals for GEI work in a specific PHS should be heavily informed
by knowledge of local context and driven by the priorities of
local actors.

I. Navigating political realities of PHS
The first category of approach to PHS acknowledges and
largely accepts “as-is” the set of constraints on GEI work posed
by misalignments of power, interests, and state functionality
in a given context. Viewing these constraints as too extensive
and as largely immovable by external actors in the short- to
medium-terms, strategies emanating from this approach seek
to maximize impact by “working with the grain.”50 This means
focusing effort on identifying and attempting to maximize
impact through openings to support progress on GEI wherever
and whenever feasible. Some initial thoughts on strategies for
implementing this approach include:

• being “scrappy”/opportunistic - Governments are not

monoliths, and political context is not static, so this set
of strategies would focus on identifying and targeting GEI
efforts and resources according to assessments of the most
auspicious actors and “moments” arising in PHS. This might
involve:
◊ targeting reformers51 - By focusing capacity support or
other resources to advance GEI (including, measures to
politically insulate or bolster political support behind
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•

those advancing reforms) on those actors who appear to
have a genuine interest in a particular good GEI outcome
(“reformers”), within government or influential actors
beyond government, the hope is to maximize what can
be achieved within their sphere of influence (mindful of
resultant risks they might face by pushing too far) and
avoid squandering resources on actors who have little
intention of genuinely committing to implementing
reforms
◊ capitalizing on “moments of opportunity”52 - Noting that
in these settings, power would not be granted but would
have to be “grabbed” whenever and wherever possible
(although this was acknowledged potentially to carry
heavy risks), another set of suggestions focused on seizing
on situations that might induce acute shifts in interests or
incentives or power balances, by, for instance:
→ trying to find instances of moral outrage and build
on these (one participant noted that evidence can
breathe life into moral outrage, so external actors
might provide such evidence when outrage on a
relevant GEI issue is brewing). Such outrage might
emerge from, for example, social or environmental
disasters or corruption scandals associated with EI
→ channeling resources to where there are cracks in
power and working to amplify these, e.g., when
there is disagreement emerging among elites,
providing support to those who are more likely to
undertake reforms in the future
→ supporting instances of sustained political/social
mobilization on which elite reformers can build and
justify their work in order to help translate openings
into more meaningful changes
→ looking for social energy, even when protests
are small, that might be amplified through
targeted support to actors who can build on these
sentiments (finding this social energy would require
deep networks on the ground)
working on the building blocks for future reform - Rather than
deploying models or strategies that are likely to fail to deliver
on overly-ambitious goals for a particular setting, focusing
near-term work on putting basic preconditions in place by:
◊ being thoughtful and deliberate about the ordering/
sequencing of priorities and tackling enabling conditions
before pursuing more advanced strategies or goals, e.g.,
focusing on creating the groundwork for meaningful
participation before insisting on consultation processes,
potentially trading off focus on advocating for specific
policy reforms (such as changes to the mining code or
implementation of environmental impact assessment
processes) in the short term in favor of trying to shift the
underlying barriers to these and other reforms being
implemented effectively (for instance, by addressing

•

formal and informal constraints on civic space or
developing and implementing effective checks on the
accumulation or exercise of power by various elites)53
◊ providing protection—legal and physical (e.g., legal
funds and resources, evacuation options, technologies
for anonymizing protest or whistle-blowing, etc.)—for
activists and reform advocates was raised as one of the
highest priority areas of action (with some participants
arguing it would be immoral to advance transparency
and accountability work when there could well be
dangerous repercussions for doing so and global
actors could unintentionally be putting local partners
in harm’s way)
◊ building trust and faith in the prospect of change to
try to overcome the fear and pessimism that can demobilize citizens of PHS was seen as another important
precursor step, one that might focus on building trust by
finding small islands of possibilities for achieving some
incremental gains on GEI to build momentum and faith
in the potential for progress and amplifying attention to
any “wins” on these fronts
understanding and accounting for the role of informal actors
and institutions and the limits and opportunities they can
pose for different approaches to GEI reforms
◊ avoiding the deployment of resources to the promotion
of reforms targeting formal authorities or legal or policy
reforms in areas of activity that are largely governed
by de facto authorities and informal relationships and
practices
◊ where responsible, leveraging informal relationships
and influence of supportive actors to try to nudge good
practices along behind the scenes in deeply personalized
settings (however, some participants cautioned against
the temptation to work with informal actors/nontraditional actors by trying to instrumentalize and
formalize them to advance the agendas of global actors,
and suggested it may be better to engage such actors
directly in defining whether and how you might work
together)

II. Trying to change the nature of underlying political
obstacles in PHS
Acknowledging that it would be very difficult for external
actors to catalyze changes in the power, interest, and
systematic dynamics of most PHS and that research is needed
on how change comes about in PHS, participants in the meeting
and interviewees for related research offered some preliminary
ideas around trying to shift unproductive power asymmetries
and interest/incentive (mis)alignments working against the
effective pursuit of improved GEI.

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 10

Supporting Good Governance of Extractive Industries in Politically Hostile Settings - Discussion Paper

A. Changing the (im)balance of power
The vast power asymmetries that characterize PHS, and that can
be exacerbated by ongoing elite access to EI rents and income,
are often viewed as among the most daunting challenges to
progress on GEI. The main pathway for countervailing the
power of elites within PHS is seen to be through enabling or
supporting coalitions of actors sharing resources, expertise,
networks, and political cover. Such coalitions—even loose,
informal or temporary ones—would bring together actors with
a common interest in a particular GEI reform or in support of the
building blocks for accountable sector governance discussed
above. Developing strategic coalitions within and across
local, national, and global levels to amplify the power
of supporters of better GEI and to buttress these actors
against attacks was seen as particularly important in PHS. Such
coalitions might connect a range of actors, including:
• reformers or champions within the formal political system,
linking them with other actors outside government or within
government, across formerly isolated pockets of good practice
or “islands of action;”54
• CSOs, community groups, and other actors already interested
in GEI issues and working on them in-country
• actors across social movements who might have overlapping
interests with a certain aspect of GEI and can provide a
broader and potentially more resilient base of support
and mobilization, e.g., women’s movements, indigenous
movements, democratic movements, environmental
movements, etc.
• “unconventional actors”—e.g., cultural figures, faith leaders
and organizations, domestic private sector groups, local
informal authorities, youth activists, labor groups, etc.—in
acting as “catalysts” and allies for change, raising the profile
of GEI concerns, creating or deepening norms around good
governance, and demanding greater accountability
• journalists and media outlets who can, depending on press
freedoms, raise the profile of key GEI issues in a particular
context and also help counter dominant elite narratives that
work against good governance
• allies from the global sphere persuaded to wield their weight
in favor of meaningful reforms (see below for more on this),
e.g.:
◊ global EI companies can use their influence (often
considerable in PHS) to lend support to GEI reforms and
standards by demanding adherence to them
◊ IFI or bilateral donors can provide information and
opportunities for these coalitions to coalesce and
influence GEI outcomes by giving them a “seat at the
table” at their convenings
◊ INGOs can provide information, financial or
organizational support to local partners as well
as international exposure, which may be useful in
leveraging support from others

Depending on the particulars of political context and GEI
priorities, different configurations of coalitions within or across
the categories above might be supported. Once potential coalition
partners are identified and mapped for a given area of reform in
a specific PHS, the next step might be to support tactical level
alliances on specific issues where there seems to be some organic
shared interest.55 This can help begin to build some momentum
for the more difficult task of supporting strategic work to foster
durable and far-reaching coalitions down the line.
B. Changing the interests and incentives
Power asymmetries need not be debilitating for efforts to
improve GEI if those holding power perceive certain reforms
to be in their interests and/or if there are incentives for making
real progress on GEI (or disincentives for failing to do so). Thus,
another set of strategies for trying to improve prospects for
progress on GEI in PHS focuses on shifting the balance of
incentives and disincentives into better alignment with
the broad goals for this work. This involves understanding
which interests or incentives of key actors can be shifted, what
it would take to do this, and who would be in a position to bring
such changes about. Some of the possible strategies discussed
included:
• changing the balance of reputational incentives/disincentives
to create a more conducive environment for progress on
reforms, e.g., through shaming bad practice via local or
international media or cultural figures, expanding downgrades
of EITI status in response to constraints on civic space, or
deploying other analogous measures to formally “shame”
governments or leaders of PHS (or companies that deal with
them) on the basis of specific practices that work against GEI
(e.g., creating a ranking of kleptocrats?)
• changing the balance of financial incentives/disincentives to
reward real progress on GEI or punish practices undermining
good governance in PHS, e.g., by:
◊ IFI or bilateral donors withholding resources that enable
PHS to persist and undertake development programs
they are likely to abuse
◊ using conditionality more strategically to reward real
progress on implementing GEI programs (or punish lack
thereof)
◊ deepening emphasis on key characteristics of PHS
(assaults on civic space, kleptocracy, corruption, etc.) in
ESG assessments or sovereign debt or other credit rating
assessments
The overall suggestion here was to think through more
systematically what can be done (and by whom) to create more
of an interest in supporting GEI reforms by making it more
painful for powerful actors in PHS to continue to undermine
GEI (sticks) or rewarding occasional examples of real progress in
these contexts (carrots).
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III. Circumventing political obstacles

LOOKING AHEAD

Finally, another set of possible strategies for working on GEI in
PHS entails deliberately avoiding sources of political obstacles
by attempting to work around them. By circumventing those
powerful actors whose perceived interests work against
improving GEI, the hope is to try to find more auspicious
alternative routes to improving sector outcomes. In practice,
for actors in the global GEI field, this may mean relocating the
targets of their interventions away from a traditional focus
on host government officials. Some ideas that were discussed
that would fall into this category include:
• engaging major, reputation-sensitive EI companies and
their investors directly to 1) improve their own social and
environmental standards and practices and insist on certain
basic standards for these with host governments when
the latter do not impose or enforce their own standards;
and 2) work directly with project-affected communities to
address some of their main concerns and priorities through
community development agreement processes or analogous
direct engagement mechanisms rather than relying on host
governments to serve as intermediaries or focal points
• focusing advocacy efforts, prosecution and other measures
on the transnational network of actors and institutions that
enable specific manifestations of “bad GEI” (e.g., corruption
or money laundering)—including those revealed in Panama
Papers, FinCen files, and Pandora Papers—such as:
◊ law firms and accountants that enable illicit flows of
money away from government coffers
◊ financial institutions that provide a home for these
flows56
◊ governments that house these financial institutions
(e.g., in Singapore, Dubai, Hong Kong, and the United
Kingdom)57
• targeting external actors who more generally enable the
leaders of PHS to stay in power despite their egregious
treatment of their populations, including home governments
(at times acting through their embassies) that provide aid
based on colonial legacies or a strategic goal perceived to be
a priority higher than development/well-being of host country
population and IFIs that continue lending to PHS despite their
dismal track record and without meaningful conditionality

Even a cursory glance at the world today makes it clear that
authoritarian practices, corruption and state capture by personal
or corporate interests, and state weakness are rampant. Ignoring
or avoiding such contextual realities in work on governance
reform, in the extractive industries and beyond, risks squandering
development resources and potentially exacerbating some
of the very governance challenges actors in the GEI field are
seeking to address. Therefore, we need to reconsider how we
work in politically hostile settings. The hope is that by sharing
some initial thoughts by a range of experts on these issues,
we would provide inspiration and a starting point for others to
further grapple with these issues in research and practice. On
the research side, an immediate priority would be accumulating
some insights on how positive change in governance happens in
PHS—what are some of the openings, catalysts, or processes to
keep an eye out for and support? On the practical side, it could
be useful to further develop, refine, and try to operationalize
some of the most promising ideas above (or others that might
emerge) in order to get a better understanding of directions that
might be more or less promising for working in PHS in the future.

Finally, it was suggested that working differently in PHS
may involve experimenting with diverse strategies. When
operating in particularly challenging settings, taking a “portfolio
approach” that includes several different types of activities
targeted at various actors and operates at different levels can be
particularly useful for identifying and landing on at least some
opportunities for real wins. This thinking mirrors PDIA58 and
other approaches to policy-making that emphasize problemsolving and iterative learning processes as the key to designing
policies and institutions conducive to development.
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